

Table of contents

| | |
|---|----|
| List of abbreviations | 1 |
| Explanation concepts | 1 |
| Introduction | 2 |
| Problem Area | 5 |
| Historical Outline | 7 |
| Institutional setup | 7 |
| <i>EC</i> | 8 |
| <i>FAC</i> | 8 |
| <i>PSC</i> | 9 |
| <i>HR</i> | 9 |
| Methods | 11 |
| Liberal Intergovernmentalism | 15 |
| <i>Why Liberal Intergovernmentalism</i> | 15 |
| <i>What is Liberal Intergovernmentalism</i> | 16 |
| <i>What is the ontology of Liberal Intergovernmentalism</i> | 17 |
| <i>The states are the actors</i> | 17 |
| <i>States are rational actors</i> | 18 |
| <i>Utilizing Liberal Intergovernmentalism</i> | 18 |
| <i>Three stage framework</i> | 19 |
| <i>National Preferences</i> | 19 |
| <i>Substantive Bargaining</i> | 21 |
| <i>Institutional Choice</i> | 24 |
| Analysis | 27 |
| <i>Analysis of unanimity and our theoretical starting point</i> | 27 |
| <i>Funding of the CSDP</i> | 29 |
| <i>The European Defence Agency</i> | 35 |
| <i>Battlegroups</i> | 45 |
| <i>Libya</i> | 47 |
| <i>CAR</i> | 50 |
| <i>Summary of the Analysis and final remarks</i> | 54 |
| Conclusion | 55 |
| Bibliography | 58 |

List of EU abbreviations

[CFSP] - Common Foreign Security Policy

[CSDP] - Common Security Defence Policy

[EDA] - European Defence Agency

[EP] - European Parliament

[EU] - European Union

[FAC] - Foreign Affairs Council

[HR] - The High Representative of the Union for foreign Affairs and Security Policy

[PSC] - Political and Security Committee

[MEP] - Member of the European Parliament

[QMV] - Qualified Majority Voting

Explanation of concepts

Integration:

We use the definition of integration, as used in Diez and Wieners textbook "European Integration Theory", where they elaborate on the wording of Haas (one of the big theorist on the area of european integration). Thus we see integration, as the process where political actors shift, especially their activities and expectation towards the institutions in the political framework of the European union (Diez and Wiener 2009).

Intergovernmental:

'Intergovernmental' as we use it, is of course closely linked to the theories of 'intergovernmentalism' as will be described further on in this project. The idea of something being of an intergovernmental nature, means in this project, that it is basically controlled by the states, and any outcome of intergovernmental process must therefore be viewed as a product of bargaining between the states (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009)

Supranational:

'Supranational' is also closely linked to the theories, that uses this concept. In many ways this varies from theory to theory, but our understanding stems from our theory of choice, Liberal intergovernmentalism. Thus we understand an area having a

‘supranational’ nature, when it can make policies, that some of the member states are directly against and can implement these (Ibid).

Introduction

The European Union finds itself in an ever-changing chaotic world full of uncertainties. A world where Putin’s Russia is acting aggressively in the east, annexing Crimea, waging a horrific proxy-war against Ukraine and doing what it can to limit European influence. It also a world where the European Union is experiencing an internal attack by populist politics, that fundamentally threatens European institutions, cooperation and integration. A world where the president of the United States of America is currently a man who overtly questions the NATO musketeer oath, demanding NATO members immediately upping the national defence budgets, if they want the United States holding a hand of security over the European States, where several have numerous military capability deficits (Chappel & Petrov 2012), and describing the NATO alliance as ‘irrelevant’ and primary international institutions as obsolete (Birnbaum & Faiola 2017). And a world where Recep Tayyip Erdogan has brought Turkey further away from the EU and established himself as an authoritarian leader with extensive executive powers. A world where the US, starting with President Barack Obama, has begun shifting its attention east towards Asia, where financial cooperation and military coordination has surged. A world that has seen the threat from vicious terror-attacks grow significantly with attacks on Paris, Copenhagen, Nice, Brussels, and most recently Manchester. It is also a world where the second largest financial and military power in the European union, The United Kingdom, has decided to leave the Union – the greatest setback that the European Community has ever experienced, sending shockwaves through Brussels and Europhiles throughout Europe.

These circumstances have made the EP members and the Europeans they represent increasingly worried about the security situation in Europe. As Danish MEP from the Danish Liberal Party Morten Løkkegård puts it: *“After Brexit, Erdogan, Putin in Crimea and Trump in The White House it is not that strange that the Europeans are discussing an increased defence cooperation in the EU”* (Appendix 1).

One of the concerns is, that we cannot rely solely on our usual partners and that Europe suddenly finds itself more isolated than ever.

(...) Going forward, we in Europe are far more left to ourselves, and inside Europe we only have one atomic power left”, as MEP Jens Rohde from the Danish Social-Liberal Party explains (Appendix 1).

These concerning developments within the security sector led the EP to put forth a resolution on the 22nd November 2016 urging the Member States, The European Council and The Commission to fulfil the potential in the Lisbon treaty and create a European Security and Defence Union with pooled defence resources and common military abilities, capabilities and policies. *“(...) in recent years the security situation in and around Europe has significantly worsened and has created arduous and unprecedented challenges that no single country or organisation is able to face alone.”* (EP/2052/2016). These are the strong terms that the EP use to describe the situation – which clearly shows that the majority of the parliament genuinely see a need for action in the defence and security area and that *“(...) solidarity and resilience require the EU to stand and to act together and systematically”* (EP/2052/2016). This new and challenging security environment in Europe *“(...) makes the establishment of the European Defence Union a matter of urgency, particularly given the increasing deterioration in the security environment at the EU’s borders (...)* (EP/2052/2016).

A majority of EP member agrees that closer military cooperation and a Defence Union is needed – but the nature of this cooperation and the Defence Union is highly contested by Member States in terms of the degree of cooperation, integration, the institutional setup and so forth: *“On one side there are those who genuinely wants defence cooperation like Germany, France and Italy. And on the other side stands those nations, who thinks that the task should resolved in NATO”,* MEP for the Danish Social Democrats Ole Christensen comments on the issues between Member States that causes problems for Defence Cooperation in Europe (Appendix 1). The Defence and security area in Europe Union called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is riddled with different approaches, opinions and preferences that makes it very difficult to operate in.

“If you equip the EU with an army and majority decisions on defence and security it

will strengthen the perception of the EU as a European state – a federation. There are many who are not interested in that, MEP Jens Rohde from the Danish Liberal Party on the challenges to the creation of a European Defence Union (Appendix 1).

Even though the EU Member States have very divergent views on the establishment of a Defence Union, the European citizens have a quite favourable view of increased EU engagement in the defence and security area. *“I actually think, that the European population can see the logic in that we ourselves are more capable of defending our interest, and that it would be cheaper to have a common army instead of 27 different ones”,* MEP Jens Rohde adds when asked about his perception of the public support for EU military integration (Appendix 1). Rohde is seemingly on the right track when judging the popular support for defence integration because *“(…) according to Eurobarometer 85.1 in June 2016 approximately two thirds of EU citizens would like to see greater EU engagement in matters of security and defence policy”* (EP/2052/2016). The EP wants to establish a European Defence Union, the public support for military integration is there, the security environment calls for action and the Lisbon treaty provides the framework for the establishment of a European Defence Union.

So what stands in the way for the realization of the potential for military integration, that is seemingly needed, but has not been fulfilled - resulting in a Resolution from the EP calling for action? That is the spine of the problem, that this project will seek to explore. What are the preferences, logics, interest and dynamics, that prevent the Member States from fulfilling the potential in the Lisbon treaty – why have they not acted when it would seem like the logical thing to do, in the current security environment?

The Resolution from the EP sees at least one dynamic, that prevent the Member States from deeply engaging in military cooperation: *“(…) Member States have so far shown a lack of will to build a European Security and Defence Union, fearing that it would become a threat to their national sovereignty”* (EP/2052/2016).

It is dynamics such as these, that we will explore and seek to explain – in order to paint a comprehensive picture of the obstacles that a European Defence Union faces. This will be done by looking at the key areas in the European Common Security and Defence Policy and the problems, that they face individually, which will help with the

understanding of the unique obstacles, that the different parts of the defence cooperation face. The reason for this approach is, that the Defence and Security area is a highly complex field with a wide range of different actors and interests. The key parts of the CSDP, that will be the object of analysis, are the European Defence Agency, the preference for unanimity procedures, financing of the CSDP and the European battlegroups. The areas and obstacles will be analysed by applying Liberal intergovernmental integration theory and its sequential Three-stage model of integration in order to understand the dynamics that prevent military integration.

The overall question that the projects seeks to answer is:

How can the underlying causes that have prevented military integration since the Lisbon Treaty, be understood through Liberal Intergovernmentalism?

Problem area

The military cooperation/union of the EU. An area of discontent. A question mark within the Union, to the point where the EP even decided upon a resolution which calls for taking advantage of integrational possibilities created, primarily in the Lisbon Treaty. Our problem area starts and ends with said resolution. The EP resolution of 22nd November, 2016. This resolution calls for a larger military cooperation and integration, and namely to “unleash the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty in regards to the CSDP” (EP/2052/2016). This phrase ‘unleash the full potential’ will be the frame of our problem area. Through the framework of the Lisbon treaty and the Treaty on the European Union, we will aim to investigate to what extent the treaty remains unfulfilled through liberal intergovernmentalism, as described by Moravcsik. We will do this by striking down on three areas of investigation, further explained in this analytical design

First we will approach the financing of the CSDP, as outlined in article 41 of the Lisbon Treaty. The question of financing looms over the military integration, due to several funding principles, like the ‘cost-lie-where-they-fall’ principle which puts nations in military participation at a large disadvantage. This roots an uneven economical aspect which will be seen throughout our analysis’ three major areas, and we will investigate the preferences and impacting powers of the underlying reasons to

formulate the system as it is. Second we will approach the European Defense Agency, an institution created to streamline the European defenses, and bring all EDA member states' military to a satisfactory level, as explained in the Lisbon Treaty article 42 (3) and article 45. - The area of EDA is especially interesting for us as a group, due to the non-participation of Denmark, the only nation not to participate in the EDA, which was a starting point for our interest in the EDA. Third we will analyse upon the lack of deployment of the EU battlegroups - the rapid response units of the EU. The battlegroups are not an idea developed for the Lisbon Treaty, instead the EU rapid response unit is an idea that originates in 1999, and the battlegroups were at full capabilities at 2007. As the EP describes: "*not yet been used, despite the opportunity and need arising*" (EP/2052/2016). Therefore we will analyse upon potential deployments, and through our actor-focused liberal intergovernmentalism, focus on why they were not decided upon for the operations.

Lastly we will also analyse upon the predominantly unanimity persisting as a decision making process. Not unlike the financing of the CSDP, the unanimity proves to be a point of contestation for integration, and an obstacle for change.

We have chosen these three points of unfulfilled potential integration on the background of the resolution. In our opinion, these three points, are the most central and important through the resolution of the EP. We fully recognize, that they mention other initiatives and there may exist points of unfulfilled potential, that are not mentioned in the resolution. However, we put a great deal trust in the EP expertise to choose and highlight in the resolution.

In of the resolution of the EP, the possibility of actions through the framework known as PESCO, is also mentioned, as a step towards a Defence Union. In some ways it therefore would be relevant in our analysis, but not to the same degree as our three chosen points of unfulfilled potentials. The reason we have chosen not to include it in our project, is that in its nature is intergovernmental, since it would always be a mission for up to eight involved states. Even though they would act with a mandate from the FAC, it would never move in the direction of further integration. This is because without supranational financing, further cooperation through the EDA or the precedent from the Battlegroups, a PESCO mission will not in itself be a sign of further integration.

These 4 points of analysis have been chosen as our main points because of their importance to the CSDP, their integral mechanisms exemplifying larger problems for further military integration and lastly because of the conundrum of the EU and their complicated relationship with military cooperation.

History

The history of the the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), and its intergovernmental framework starts with its inclusion into the European Union, created in the Maastricht treaty of 1993. From the seventies until the Maastricht treaty, it was an area of cooperation between the states, with no institutional influence or say in the proceedings.

Created in the second (and intergovernmental) pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP became a part of the newly created European Union, though clearly intergovernmental in its approach. As the European Communities evolved into a monetary union, security was formally added to the policy agenda. Furthermore 'second-order' decisions could be subject to Qualified Majority Voting if decided by the council.

Following the Maastricht treaty, the Amsterdam treaty broadened the QMV within CFSP even further, making it the norm during exceptional circumstances for joint actions and common positions. This has been the general direction for the CFSP. Our focus lies after the Lisbon treaty, which is what we will explain and explore.

Institutional setup of the relevant features of the CSDP

In the following segment, we will describe in which forums (and subsequently institutions) the decisions and negotiations of our chosen points of unfulfilled integration in accordance with the Lisbon treaty, could be taking place. Furthermore we will mention the relevant agencies, committees and other institutions, that could have an affect on these. The relationship between these forums and actors will be visualized with a "flow-chart" (see figure 1.1). Lastly, we will describe how our three points of unfulfilled integration is placed within this matrix.

The European Council

The European Council is the highest institution in the “hierarchy” of the CSDP. It consists of the heads of states from all member states and is chaired by the permanent presidency, which, for the time being, is Donald Tusk.

Their tasks and responsibilities on the area of the CSDP, and the rest of the CFSP, is defined in article 26 clause 1 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Council is given the duty of defining the strategic interests and setting the overall course and goals for the Union's policies on the CSDP area. And as it is stated in article 15 clause 4 of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council makes decisions with unanimity on everything, unless it is stated in the treaty, which is not in the case of CSDP.

The European Council's relationship with FAC is two-sided. On one hand, it is defined in the aforementioned articles, that they shall provide guidelines for the policies of FAC. On the other hand, in most instances the states' representatives in the European Council is on the domestic level the head of government for the same states represented in FAC. Therefore it is obvious, that the states positions would be the same in the European Council as in FAC.

The Foreign Affairs Council

FAC can in many ways be seen as the main principal decision maker on the area of the CSDP. Although the European Council set the goals and aims for the CSDP, it is FAC who votes on the practical policies of the CSDP, and the rest of the CFSP. As there is no Council consisting of Defence ministers on a formal EU level, The Defence ministers also use the FAC to discuss (Dover & Kristensen 2016).

FAC consists of the ministers of Foreign Affairs from each member state, whom meet at least once a month. The meetings are chaired by the HR (whose role we will elaborate later on in this chapter). The HR therefore have a lot of influence over the topics of discussion. The HR also have the power of proposing policies for FAC to vote on, as it is mentioned in the Lisbon treaty article 42 clause 4.

This clause also facilitate the voting-procedure of FAC, which is unanimity or consensus as it is called in the text of the treaty. Nonetheless, this leaves each state with a de facto vetoing power (all this will be elaborated and discussed more further on in the analysis of this project).

The ministers of FAC does not only coordinate and gets relevant information

from both domestic sources and agencies. PSC plays an important part in briefing FAC in the matters they are voting on (Dover & Kristensen 2016).

The Political and Security Committee

The PSC is one of, if not the, most important committee in the whole CSDP. The members of the PSC is mostly high ranking ambassadors and representative from the member states. (Norheim-Martinsen 2013).

Of all the task that fall upon the PSC, the most important one is to create consensus on policies before they reach the FAC and, in turn, the ministers are to vote on the policies. Norheim-Martinsen, a Norwegian scholar on the subject of military and the EU, sees the PSC as the most important actor or forum in this regard (Ibid).

As a part of creating consensus, PSC have a lot of different tasks, which includes advising FAC and overlooking the implementation of the policies voted through FAC (Ibid). This variety of tasks have earned PSC the nickname amongst scholars of the EU, "the workhorse of the CSDP". This stems as mentioned earlier on from the fact, that most of the representatives who work in the PSC, are high ranking officials with either the authority to make deals on behalf of the member state they represents, or because they are in contact with the right actors on the domestic levels (Ibid). Furthermore Norheim-Martinsen have found, that there is a shared '*esprit de corps*' in PSC. This helps with the coordinations and negotiations between the states, and thus securing a higher likelihood of the policies to be both voted through efficiently, thereby not always abiding to the will the lowest common denominator (Ibid).

Beyond the earlier mentioned tasks, the PSC also manages a whole rhizome of different committees and the parts of the Council Secretariat, that are involved in CSDP area. Most important of those, is the EU Military Committee, which consists of all the chiefs of military from each member states. They come together and advise FAC and the European Council, through the PSC on all military matters from coordinating purchase of military hardware to recommendations on direct military actions. All of the Council Secretariat exists for the exact same reason (Ibid).

High Representative

'The High Representative of the Union for foreign Affairs and Security Policy' is somewhat a new post in the EU. With the Lisbon Treaty, the obligations for the formerly

'High Representative' was greatly expanded. Besides chairing FAC, the HR is also the Vice-president of the Commission. Much of the reason behind this, was to clarify the blurred lines, that still exists between the European Council and FAC on one side, and the Commission on the other. This role forces the HR to negotiate and interact with lots of different actors. Under the first HR, Lady Catherine Ashton, it was discussed widely whether the role was too comprehensive for one person (Norheim-Martinsen 2013).

The HR is, without a doubt, the most important actor in the institutional set-up. The HR has a broad range of responsibilities and opportunities to affect the decision-making-process in the area of CSDP. This stems from both chairing FAC, thereby setting the agenda, and being the only actor, except the member states, that can propose policies in FAC, from being the Vice-president of the Commission, attending all their meetings (Dover & Kristensen 2016).

Our three chosen points of unfulfilled integrations in the institutional set-up.

- Battlegroups

If the battlegroups ever should be deployed it would be in the above-mentioned decision-making-process. It would be up the FAC by an unanimity vote, to make the decision. The decision could be proposed either by a member state or HR. Lastly the overwatch of the deployment, would be taking care of, by the PSC.

- EDA

Any policy that the EDA would carry through, whether it be a standardization of military hardware or any other kind of coordination, had to be voted unanimous by FAC. The same have to happen with the EDAs budget.

- Financing (art. 41)

As it is stated in article 41 of the Lisbon treaty all decisions on the budget and financing related to military operations, also should be voted on unanimously by the FAC.




Figure 1.1 - Flowchart of decision making process.

Methods

For this project, the majority of our empirical material has mostly been gathered through unobtrusive methods. Our choice of data-collection has to an extent reflected our choice of theory. As we will be making use of liberal theories, one of our core assumptions is that actors are rational. Through this understanding of the actors, the structures, which we will be applying our theory to, are as such the result of rational decision making processes. By examining these structures we will be able to better understand the interaction of states (Beach 2014). We will now be explaining how we made use of our data-collection methods.

First of, we did a number of written interviews with Danish Members of the EP in order to get an understanding of what perceptions of EU military integration can be found in the EP across the political spectrum. The interviews are not object of any

analysis, but are used as an aid in exploring the field, assisting us in choosing what areas to focus on so that we can be successful in identifying and exploring the barriers that prevent military integration. The interviews are used as an introduction to the field and the paradigms and dynamics that are in play in the complex CSDP area.

For our study, we almost solely relied on content analysis. One way to engage with state behaviour, is by analyzing texts that are produced on a governmental level. Content analysis is a multi-methods approach, which can take many forms depending on the study in which it appears. The method can both be applied quantitatively or qualitatively and is especially relevant to our project, as our point of departure is set within the potential frames of military integration, declared within the Lisbon Treaty. *“The strategic culture of a given state is expected to be evident in key texts and can be tested using analytical tools such as content analysis (...). (Beach, 2012. Pg 158).*

Content analysis is an unobtrusive method, meaning that the data is not directly affected by the researchers, which provides a credible basis of empirical material. When engaging with intrusive methods, such as observations or interviews, a study might end up influencing the milieu or affecting the interviewee, towards a predisposed conclusion made by the researcher. This requires a higher degree of reflexivity and acknowledgement towards the study's own position within the field. Content analysis differs from that in the sense that *‘(...) the data exists independent of the research’* (Hesse-Bieber & Leavy, 2011. Pg 228). Reflexivity is however still relevant within content analysis, as the texts we use (and the texts we chose not to use) will have an impact on the findings of our research. As such, our primary and secondary data has been carefully selected; our primary data consists of resolutions, treaties and EP summaries. These serve as our point of genesis for understanding the processes and structures that exists within the CSDP, as they are directly representative of the decisions made within the EU. Our secondary data has been chosen to best examine and contextualize our primary data.

In the following, we will put our theoretical and methodical stand in perspective to the existing stances on the subject, from the recognized grand theories on Foreign policy.

Analytical Framework

As dictated by our theory, the analysis of our project is formed as a three-stage analysis. This framework, as described original by Moravcsik, is rather common in the Foreign Policy analysis. The idea of analyzing Foreign Policy on multiple levels where the process that causes the outcome are the focus of the analysis, were introduced by Putnam in 1988. It is in this tradition, that Moravcsik analysis framework, was developed. Putnams original model was only a two-level but Moravcsik added the idea of an institutional choice, which is more relevant in the academia dealing with EU (Beach 2012).

Theories in Foreign Policy definition

An important methodology question one have to ask to understand the analytical approach of one's project, is how the theory is perceived in the project. There are in the area of foreign policy analysis a number of ways theories have traditionally been viewed. In the following we will describe how we perceive our theory.

Derek Beach describes in his book "Analyzing Foreign Policy" how a theory of foreign policy provides a simplified explanation of an real empirical phenomena, since explanations of events do not emerge by them self. In relations to our project, this could be stated as 'theories should make it possible to predict states behavior' (Beach 2012).

Therefore the theory can be used to focusing the attention of the analysis to the most vital and significant elements (Ibid). Thus they work as analytical tools, by simplifying the complex empiric of reality, and thereby understanding the phenomenon (Ibid). The goal of the theory is to bring a sufficient explanation of the outcome in focus on the background of the, by the theory appointed, most important aspects (Ibid).

Another important question is; what makes a theory a theory of foreign policy and not a theory of domestic policy?

There are a number of ways these two distinct ways of theorising differ. In theories of foreign policies it is commonly acknowledged that there exists different rules and dynamics on the area of foreign policy. Domestic theories usually sees the domestic organisations, institution and public figures as actors, while our theoretical starting point acknowledge and take the domestic constituency in account, it still has the states as their main actors. Another difference is how much focus there is on the

legislative part of the government, in contrast to the executive part. In areas of foreign policy, the executive part of the government have traditionally, and across the western societies, normally been the dominant one, where in most democratic states there is much more of an equal interplay in the areas of domestic policies (Ibid)

Rationalist states

A core assumption in Liberal Intergovernmentalism is the idea of the state as a rational actor. This approach to the state dictates that the state always chooses the decision that makes the state gain the most in the context that it makes the decision. This is also the reason that decision-making theories have been the traditional core of foreign policy analysis (Beach 2012).

As in other academic disciplines, there is an ever-going discussion of agency versus structure in theories of foreign policies. In this regard, the tradition from Putnam of making multilevel analysis design foreign policy theories, have taken a rather different stance. The aim of a multilevel analysis of foreign policies, is both to explain what structures and other external elements in the states context, that forms the states preferences they act on and their agency. Therefore our theoretical standpoint can not be considered one-sided in regards to the agency-structure discussion. - Even though we view the states as rational actors, we also focus on the the premises for their agency (Ibid).

Negotiation

It is a common understanding of Foreign Policy, chosen by an entity in international relations, always will be the result of some kind of "battle" within the entity (Beach 2012). In relation to our project, we see this "battle" as the negotiations that happens in the institutional setup of the CSDP. Furthermore in the realist perspective, the chosen Foreign Policy will be seen as mainly the one preferred or closest to the one preferred by the strongest actor (Ibid).

An important question in the discussion of how to analysis foreign policies in the multilevel analytical framework of Moravcsik theory, is how to perceive the importance of the concrete negotiations. In this case Moravcsik himself, have been very clear in the respect, that he sees the role as a negligible one, for determining the outcomes. Moravcsik theory, and thereby our analytical approach dictates, that the outcomes of

negotiations on the international level between states are determined by the prior issue-specific power balance. Thus one should only analyse on the states national preferences and the power balance, that are a result of the national preferences (Ibid).

This means that it is not an essential problem for our analysis, that we can not access the forums and discussions where decisions on whether to unleash the potential of the Lisbon treaty in the area of the CSDP are being negotiated. Following our theoretical standpoint, it should only be relevant to look at the depositions of the states, before the negotiations are started.

EU as institution or actor

Another important discussion in the of Foreign Policy is whether the EU can be viewed as having a Foreign Policy that would be separate from the individual member states.

Usually, any notion about international institutions having an independent foreign policy is discarded by the most dominant theories on foreign policies, but the EU is the exception to the rule (Beach 2012). In this case, Moravcsik gives clear answers on how to apply his framework of analysis to the complex reality. He does not view the foreign policy of the EU as independent from the member states, but more as a tool of the pooled interests of the member states (Ibid). Therefore we can limit our focus on institutional actors to those directly influencing the CSDP area like the HR. Elements like the Political Security Committee can thus not be viewed as independent actors in the area, since they are a forum for interstate discussions and any policy they could seek, should “only” be as the “pooled interests” of the member states.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Why Liberal Intergovernmentalism?

We have chosen the Liberal Intergovernmental theory and its analytical framework for the analysis of integration within the CSDP. We have done this because it allows us to understand the multi-causal nature of the reasons and obstacles to integration within the CSDP.

The frameworks of the CSDP are predominantly intergovernmental structured - it is mostly managed by the individual EU member states. The actor-oriented approach to understanding European cooperation Liberal Intergovernmentalism supplies, is therefore ideal for understanding how the nation states cooperate internationally, how they determine what they want, how they bargain, and how and why institutions turn out as they do. This can help the understanding of why some institutions do not function efficiently and why some policy areas are more difficult to facilitate cooperation in (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009).

Essentially, Liberal Intergovernmentalism can give the insight required to explain why and how European state actors preferences and motives shape international cooperation and the institutions that facilitate this cooperation, enabling an assessment of the state of and problems facing the cooperation within the CSDP in Europe. This further allows us to identify the concrete obstacles that hinders the fulfillment of the potential for security and defence cooperation already established within The Lisbon Treaty.

What is Liberal Intergovernmentalism?

Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a baseline theory in the study of regional integration which seeks to explain the broad evolution of regional integration. Its goal is to specify the motivations of social actors, states, and leaders and in doing so, enabling us to derive explanation and predictions from their aggregate behaviour and the dynamic effect of their behaviour, that we can use to empirically explain and predict european integration or the lack thereof (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009).

It gives a synthetic framework approach that links together multiple factors, theories and approaches into a single and coherent approach, therefore it strongly rejects monocausality. Through a multi-stage model with three different areas and theories, that can be applied in an analysis. These are National preferences, Substantive bargaining and Choice of institutions. Even though LI stresses the need for multi-causality, it is still simple because its basic premises and understandings are not abstract and can be understood with just a few interrelated assumptions and propositions, that seek to simplify EU politics and stress the exclusion of secondary activities (Ibid).

We use LI to understand regional integration in the CSDP area as the precise specification of each theory will vary on the issues, area of integration and circumstances. Therefore LI is great at analysing regional integration in the EU, because it can peel the 'irrelevant, distracting factors away stressing 'the essentials''. It has a great potential for explanation and generalization because of its multicausality and diversity.

What is the ontology of Liberal Intergovernmentalism?

One of the most powerful things about LI is the apparent accuracy of its quite substantive ontological core assumptions, the empirical explanation and predictive power, these have in the area of European politics and integration. So what are these assumptions?

The two Key ontological assumptions:

1. **The states are the actors:** We must study states as the critical actors in the context of anarchy
 - a. States achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining
 - b. The European Community must be seen as an international regime for policy coordination
 - c. Is not realist: National security is not necessarily primary motivation, power of states are not based on raw power and coercive capabilities, states are not black boxes with uniform identities and preferences and interstate institutions are most certainly significant
 - d. EU member-states are basically 'masters of treaty' who still enjoy pre-eminent decision-making powers and political legitimacy
 - e. International institutions are tools for the nation states, that can be used as a forum for bargaining and negotiation

2. States are rational actors

- a. The states calculate the utility of alternative courses, decisions and choose the course of action that maximises and satisfies their individual utility under the unique circumstances that surround them
- b. They choose their course of action in response to constraints and opportunities, that stem from factors like economical interests, domestic pressures and constituents and states relative power and ideology
- c. It is the individual state-actors and their agencies that are assumed to be rational

(Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009)

Utilizing Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Because of the core assumptions of states as rational actors, Liberal Intergovernmentalism explains collective outcomes in EU integration, as a result of aggregated individual action made in the effective pursuit of the individual nations preferences.

Therefore states cooperate, engage in and establish international institutions on basis of interdependent, strategic, rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations and the relative power relations at play within these relations.

We will apply a three-stage framework in our analysis of integration in the CSDP area. The Three-stage model is a framework that can explain the decisions nation states makes to cooperate internationally - decisions that then determine the nature of the institutions and the policy outcomes (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009).

The three stages in the model are separate, use individual concepts and follow a logical order of how the states act in international cooperations. The Three-stage model framework for analysis is as follows: First, states define their preferences. Secondly, they bargain to substantive agreements. Finally, they create or adjust institutions to secure the outcomes (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009).

The three-stage model will be applied to understand and identify the sources of lack of outcomes in the CSDP area. It is done with the use of said model, because one can only explain cooperation outcomes by analysing a multi-causal sequences (Ibid).

In this next section, The Three-stage Framework, its concepts, themes and arguments will be presented.

Three-Stage Framework

As mentioned before, The Three-stage Framework enables us through a multicausal analysis to understand the cooperation in the CSDP area. The concepts of the three stages: national preferences, substantive bargaining and institutional choice will be outlined next. Including in the way the concepts will be operationalized on the European CSDP arena.

National Preferences

National preferences in Moravcsik's optic is to be understood as the factors and conditions, that motivate state-actors to act as they do. It "opens up the black boxes of the states", to understand which domestic circumstances and settings for the state that create the demand for specific policies (Moravcsik 1993). The concepts in this part of the three stage framework originates in Liberal theory.

The state is still looked upon as a unitary actor, that solely channel the domestic demand for policies, but the demand stem from various sources, that are different from issue to issue. This is why, Moravcsik emphasize the importance of the analyses of the Liberal intergovernmental kind to be "issue-specific" (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009). In contrast to popular belief, the concepts of Liberal theory, does not solely focus on economic concerns, when trying to identify the national preferences, although it is also an important aspect (Ibid.). Especially in such areas as foreign and defence policies non-economic concerns, as geopolitical concerns are crucial for understanding the national preferences (ibid). As Moravcsik points out, in the area of defence, there is an inherent incalculability of the benefits and downsides, which makes it difficult for a mobilization of domestic economic interests group. This pave the way for a different form of pressure, an ideological kind. The heads of state can on this area support policies there to a greater extent reflect their ideological standpoints (Moravcsik 1993). The question of the issue-specific approach will be elaborated in the following.

Operationalization of national preferences

The area of security and defence is an area that are exceptional issue-specific and the analytical approach should be as well. First of all, the area is one of vast uncertainty, which as we mentioned above, makes the ideology of the states an important factor behind the creation of the national preferences (Moravcsik 1993). If the state is more prone to a pacifistic worldview, their national preferences would be that of fewer military actions. Furthermore, states might have an ideological preference on who to cooperate with. Some EU states sees the US as their most important military alliance partner, and therefore have national preferences of prioritize cooperation across the atlantic. Furthermore a nationalistic or eurosceptic ideology of the head of state might bring concerns over loss of sovereignty, through further military cooperation.

Secondly, the area of security and defence is interconnected to a wide degree of geo-political factors. The states' geographical placement in Europe has a great influence on their national preferences. The demand for policies will vary with which negative externalities, that are of the most importance for each state. As such states in eastern Europe is more likely to have national preferences of policies, that could counter Russia's aggression, whereas France might have national preferences for policies, that could counter terrorism (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009).

In relation to the geographical placement, a factor that can create national preferences in the area of defence, would be the military power of the specific state. The national preferences will vary from states with a lesser military-power and those with a greater one.

Membership of NATO is also an important factor in creating the national preferences. States that are not a member of NATO, but still have a demand for policy of international cooperation, would be forced to seek it fulfilled in the framework of EU military cooperations.

Moravcsik points out that national security is not always the main factor of national preferences in the area of defence for many states in the EU, because of the microscopic chance of internal war in the EU. Therefore, the interdependency between the states, especially the economic interdependence is also an important factor to understand the national preferences (Moravcsik 1993).

Substantive Bargain

This second part of the three stage framework, focus on the relationship between the relevant actors and what dynamics are in play here. Its theoretical origin is in the intergovernmental theories, more specific bargain theory (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009). The premise of this theory is that the value chased by the states anticipating in the negotiations is the mutual benefits, are facilitated in the framework of the negotiations (Moravcsik 1993).

Another premise for bargain theory is that states weigh their possibilities in a negotiation in what is commonly known as a 'cost-benefit analysis'. This means they make their decisions after considering the gains and losses of the possibles outcomes and chooses the one, where the gains outweighs the losses the most, according to the state. This is a consequence of viewing the actors as rational. The focus of this part of the analysis, is to identify and understand the asymmetric relation in the negotiation, used by the states as a form of relative power, or known as 'bargain power' (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009).

From the former part we are aware of the states' national preferences, therefore this part aim to identify only the relation of bargaining power that stems from the national preferences. Following the national preferences, one can define the so-called "bargaining space", which is the spectrum of possible outcomes, that are better than status quo for each anticipating state. There is exceptions for this rule, that will be elaborated further on, but in every other case, the outcome should be found in this spectrum (Moravcsik 1993).

Moravcsik uses three main concepts to analyse this. They are all dynamics, where one actor threatens or make compromises, in the pursuit for a more favourable policy outcome. States that have an alternative to the cooperation, that is superior to any option in the "bargaining space" will have the strongest bargain power (Moravcsik 1993).

Relative Bargain Power

Threat of non-cooperation/unilateral policies

States can gain more bargain power in a negotiation, if they can "threaten" with non-cooperation, which would mean not to support the common policy proposal and

thereby vetoing it, in the area of CSDP. It would typical be the states that have the least to win by changing status quo (Moravcsik 1993). Especially if they have the opportunity of an unilateral policy, where they themselves impose a policy, that to some extent satisfy the demand for action on the issue. In contrast, the states that have the most to win from the proposed policy is in the weakest position for negotiation, because the other actors are aware, that these states are the ones who are willing to give up the most for making the cooperation happen. The point of compromise will therefore be located closer to the point of the states who have less to win (Moravcsik 1993).

Furthermore states that are more vulnerable from negative externalised disruption will also have less bargain power, because the domestic policies are not as autonomy, as the states that are more robust to external influence (Ibid).

Threat of alternative coalitions/threat of exclusion

States can also threaten with alternative coalitions to implement the wanted policies, instead of agreeing on a compromise, that it doesn't find as attractive as the one in a possible alternative coalition. This gives a state bargain power, when other states sees, that it is possible, to find a more willing coalition elsewhere. This is a threat, because of two dynamics. The first is because the state without this bargain power might win more of the possible policy than status quo (Moravcsik 1993). The second is also known as *the threat of exclusion*, which is when a state is afraid that an alternative coalition might bring some negative externalities. This can force a state to what is known as "Pareto-improving". Moravcsik define this as when a state chooses to support a change to status quo, that would put them in a less favorable position, than status quo. They do this because the negative externalities from policy coalitions, that they can not anticipate, are so severe that they are willing to sign a policy that brings them in a worse situation than status quo (Moravcsik 1993). Moravcsik sees two ways this can happen in EU-cooperation. Firstly, an alternative coalition could be made with non-EU members, most likely in the area of defence and security, through a NATO or UN cooperation as these are the other major frameworks for cooperation for EU members on the area of defence and security. Secondly such an alternative coalition could be made inside the EU, with forming or deepening of a cooperations, where not all EU members participate (Ibid).

Operationalization of substantive bargain

In relation to the area of CSDP, there is a number of specific asymmetric relations of bargaining power, that are in play. As mentioned in the operationalization of the national preferences, the area of defence and security is vastly issue-specific. Accordingly there are specific asymmetric relations to focus on.

In the cases of threats of non-cooperations in the area of CSDP, the concept dictates the greater effect of state's unilateral policies on the area, the greater the bargain power. The most straightforward way of measuring the effect of unilateral policies on the area of defence, would be to measure strength of a nation's military, since it would be this part of the state, that would enforce the policies. Furthermore the geo-political strategic location of the state, also plays an important role. This is connected with the dynamic, that states that are more vulnerable negative externalities, have less bargain power.

If the case of Russia's aggression, a state like United Kingdom would have more bargain power, through the threat of non-cooperation, than Estonia, because of the strength of their military and their geographical placement, thus one is more vulnerable to negative external influence. If the UK then views the possible unilateral policies as more favorable, then it would choose that way of satisfying the demand for policy.

This will explain why states chooses unilateral policies instead of cooperation.

In the case of threat of alternative coalitions it is a matter of whether states can find an alternative, which suits them better. In the area of CSDP, it would normally be NATO or the UN. If states find an alternative coalitions though these frameworks, that they consider to be more superior than those in the CSDP framework, they would be more prone to choose these coalitions.

States with less bargain power would not be forced into "Pareto-improving", if they do not see any downsides, if other states choose an alternative coalition. This is strongly connected to the "threat of exclusion", Here states with less bargain power, do not see this threat as real. Therefore these states would not see the necessity of accepting a change of policy, that in their perspective is worse than status quo.

This will explain why states chooses alternative coalitions instead of cooperation.

Institutional choices

The nation states see institutions as forums for interstate bargain and negotiation, which is wanted, because it reduces their cost of transactions - this point is derived from contemporary regime theory (Moravcsik 1993).

The reduction in transaction costs are a main motive for states to engage in international institutions. This essentially means, that by participating in international institutions, states reduce their costs of transaction of further international negotiations. The transaction cost is reduced, because the institutions provide necessary information that reduces states uncertainty about each other's plans, future preferences and general behaviour.

The negotiations and cooperation establish rules for gains and reduce the cost of monitoring the behaviour of other states, the cost of coordination activities and gives the opportunity of mutual-sanctions against states, that do not comply (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009). The states use the institutions as a mean to deal with unexpected, unforeseen and unwanted consequences, because it provides an arena with norms and effective procedures for negotiation, that help to reduce uncertainty (Moravcsik 1993).

In areas where the transaction costs - the cost of identifying issues, codifying agreements, negotiating deals and bargains, monitoring and enforcing compliance - are high, states are more likely to engage in cooperation, share their information thereby reducing uncertainty (Moravcsik 1993).

A nation's surrender of sovereignty to, and cooperation in is also most likely to happen, whenever the status quo is unattractive to the nation state. There also three factors that prone states to give up sovereignty and/or engage in cooperation.

These are:

External representation

A single agent to represent the common position within the EU is more efficient and strong, but it is most important, that states trust the actors who act on their behalf. In order for this to happen, the actor must be perceived as neutral. This means that the

agent must have a clear mandate, and only undertakes limited independent decision-making during short periods of time, like in an emergency.

Agenda-setting

When there is a wide consensus on an agenda or a policy area, the realization of this agenda is more efficient if the power to set the agenda is given to a supranational institution. This is, because the supranational institution would be a more neutral agenda-setter than a national government, which could be accused of favouring the problems that are more important, following their national preferences. (Moravcsik 1993).

Enforcement

The possibilities for cooperation are greatly enhanced, when there are neutral procedures in place, that monitor, interpret and enforce compliance. It is through neutral enforcement, that states and their governments can make credible commitments, because the commit to having them enforced is by a supranational body. Outsourcing of powers and engagement in cooperation from the nation states is always more likely, when there is a commitment to the fulfilling of broad goals. When the agenda and goals are broad, the political risk is small.

The political risk is the risk of political defeat or loss to a different government and its interest. That's why, governments incentive to delegate power, pool decisions and engage in cooperation, is only there, when there is little chance of the decisions made being biased and unforeseen which could pose a threat to the interests of the state (Moravcsik 1993).

Operating within supranational institutions presents risk to states when policies are unstructured and open-ended. Often when confronted with the choice of delegating authority to policies and institutional frameworks, which are not fully developed, states are reluctant to do so. Engaging with open ended decisions leaves states vulnerable to future uncertainty, as the direction of policies can turn out to be unfavorable (Moravcsik 1993). In relation to the CSDP, EDA is an example of how the open-ended decision is treated with caution. The nature of uncertainty embedded in the future evolvement of the policy, has made several state-actors give up their commitment and support.

The operationalization of institutional choice

As the theory assumes, states enter intergovernmental cooperation through institutions to reduce the costs of transaction. These institutions entice the states with norms and knowledge, making the decisions more transparent. When we apply this knowledge, we can discover reasons to commitment to institutions and get a better understanding of why nations commits to one institution over another.

The institutional choice also tells us that cooperation is more prevalent when the status-quo is a worse alternative to the nation-state. As no European states are in any immediate danger, it helps explain states largely having little reason to cooperate. This basic principle of cooperation or pooling of sovereignty is coupled with three other reasons to cooperate.

These are: External representation, when the countries trust a natural representation, whom have a clear mandate and can speak on their behalf in external matters.

Agenda-setting, when the most efficient solution on a widely acknowledged problem.

Last but not least the institutions are capable of enforcing agreements and supervising it, adds up to reasons why states may decide to use an institutions as a arena for discussions for agreements.

This is highlighted in the Member States choices to supervene the CFSP and choose outside institutions as NATO, UN and other institutions. By looking at these 3 reasons to cooperate we will argue that the lack of agenda-setting and enforcement is a general influential on the shortcomings we will analyse in this paper.

The lack of an agenda that is in accordance with each state's national preferences, and therefore could be accused of not being "neutral", because it would be viewed as favouring other states national preferences. A state would not choose an institution, which would set an agenda on the CSDP area, that does not correspond with its national preferences.

We will also look at enforcement, as we believe the European Union as an institutional actor has been underwhelming in enforcing and promoting advancement within our arenas of the CFSP. Institutional choice provides us with an opportunity to explain choices of institutions. It can help us uncover positives and deficiencies within

institutions, by looking at the choices of the nation-states, thus keeping a focus on member states while allowing us to discuss and dissect the institutional aspect of liberal intergovernmentalism and our choice of areas.

Analysis

Analysis of unanimity and our theoretical starting point

To start off our analysis, we will explain the voting processes of the CSDP and connect this particular way of voting in the EU system, with our theoretical starting point.

The unanimity consensus vote

As mentioned above in the description of the institutional set-up for the CSDP, nearly all decisions (including those relevant for our analysis) are made with either “consensus” in regards to the council (article 15 clause 4, Lisbon treaty) or with “unanimity” in regards to FAC (article 42 clause 4). In practical terms, there is no difference between these two concepts and this leaves each state with a de facto veto power over the CSDP area.

Many scholars have discussed the implications of this way of structuring the decision-making-processes. In this chapter, we will draw on a few of these scholars to show the overall academic stance on the “unanimity-vote” in the area of the CSDP.

Dyson and Konstadinides, both lectures of International Relations and Law at London University and Surrey University, stated that one can clearly see in the phrasing of the Lisbon treaty, that member states seek to stay in control of the area of the CSDP. In Dyson and Konstadinides opinion, states do so in order to maintain control over the area of defence (Dyson & Konstadinides 2013).

Johan Fredborn Larsson from Lund elaborated in his Political Science PhD thesis, in which he calls the unanimity and thereby de-facto veto-power, a safeguard for the member states, not letting the sovereignty of defence slip out of their hands (Larsson 2010).

Lastly Norheim-Martinsen (also mentioned in the chapter about the Institutional setup of the CSDP), goes further and argue that the unanimity vote “hampers the efficiency” of the CSDP (Norheim-Martinsen 2013) and often creates “bottlenecks” in

time of crises (Ibid).

These academic articles frame an important point for our analysis, which is that the setup of decision-making-processes within the CSDP keeps member states in control through unanimity and the de-facto veto-power.

Connecting 'unanimity' with Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Moravcsik argues in "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", which we have adopted as our theoretical stance, that the decision-making-processes should be viewed as intergovernmental (Moravcsik 1993). This article is written almost two decades before the Lisbon treaty was put into effect. However, as shown above, the states are still the actors who largely controls the evolution of CSDP, especially in relation to the unfulfilled points of integration.

The above-mentioned academia indicates that the CSDP is still intergovernmental; vote of unanimity is described as the "intergovernmental method of cooperation" by Larsson (Dyson & Konstadinidis 2013; Larsson 2013; Norheim-Martinsen 2013). Furthermore, they point towards some different factors, of which some keeps it this way and others show its' intergovernmental nature.

The lack of concrete goals is one of these factors. Solana, who was the last HR before the Lisbon treaty, is quoted for having said that the goals of the CSDP was "to be too broadly defined, lacking clear priorities" in Norheim-Martinsen' book. It is further elaborated, that this unspecific structure is in the states interests, since it is harder for the institutions to act on their own; as such, the cooperation stays intergovernmental (Norheim-Martinsen 2013). Dyson and Konstadinides also supports this point, by connecting the lack of concrete goals, with the intergovernmental interplay in the area of CSDP (Dyson & Konstadinides 2013).

Norheim-Martinsen goes into depth with the fact, that it will always, within the framework of the CSDP, be up to the states to provide the capabilities for military actions (Norheim-Martinsen 2013). This goes to show, that the states have to be viewed as the main actor, especially if policies should have a chance of getting implemented, since states can not be forced to use their military power.

We can thus conclude that even though the institutional actors, such as HR or the

Commission, plays an important role, they should not be the main object of analysis.

This is also seen in the EP's resolution of 22nd November 2016. It calls upon many actors, also the institutional actors, to fulfill the integration potential of the Lisbon treaty. However it is mainly addressed to the member states and they are directly addressed in our three chosen points of unfulfilled integration.

Funding of the CSDP

Article 41 of the Lisbon treaty describes how the military operations of the CSDP is financed. It applies to the framework of military operations done by the European Union (Lisbon Treaty 2007). The rules that go behind financing CSDP are complex and undergo a variety of decision making processes. This part of the analysis will draw upon Fabien Terpan's findings in his article 'Financing Common Security and Defense Policy: explaining change and the inertia in a fragmented flexible structure'.

Terpan describes the financing of the CSDP as being fragmented 'horizontally' and 'vertically'. Vertical fragmentation refers to the fact that member states have no obligation to participate in the financing of missions. Even though military operations will often have financial support from third-party countries, missions will rarely be relevant for all 28 member states, making financing uncertain. Horizontal fragmentation refers to the multiple mechanisms of funding that are available to the CSDP, depending on the objective nature of the mission (Terpan 2014). Funding is especially notable, because the mechanisms of finance that go behind Europe's defense capabilities have a direct impact on the efficiency of the CSDP.

The financial framework of the CSDP has undergone a number of transformations from its point of origin. The framework has namely been influenced by three structural changes, which was brought on by the Amsterdam Treaty, the introduction of the Athena mechanism and the Lisbon treaty (European Parliament 2014).

The CSDP mainly makes use of two sources for funding for military and defensive operations. Whereas civilian operations are mostly based of supranational mechanisms, CSDP uses intergovernmental mechanisms where member states are in control of the financing. By far, most of the expenditures of the CSDP is covered by participating

member on 'a cost fall where they land' principle. This principle applies to the costs of deployed equipment and personal to the theatre of operations (Terpan 2016).

The secondary source of financing, derives from the mechanism called 'Athena', which was adopted by the CFSP in 2014 (European Parliament 2014). The Athena mechanism was introduced with the intention of creating a permanent structure for funding the common costs associated with missions of defensive or military nature. Amongst other things, Athena covers the costs associated with exploratory/fact finding missions, headquarters, infrastructure and medical evacuations. The impact of Athena is somewhat limited, as it approximately only covers about ten to fifteen percent of the mission costs. (European Parliament, 2016)

The expenditure of the CSDP has very limited access to the Union Budget; only administrative and specific non-military non-defensive missions. As such, the financial processes of the CSDP are determined on an intergovernmental level by Member States (FAC). Activities that are of a civilian nature mostly makes use of processes which are supranational structured through CFSP. The following chart categorizes the primary and secondary sources of financing available to military and civilian operations.




Figure 2.1 (Terpan 2015)

Fabian Terpan identifies three main issues within the financial framework of the CSDP. These will serve as our base of understanding the financial barriers that are obstructing full realization of European military integration. We will combine Terpan's

three problems with the Three-Stage analysis-model, and thereby identify the barriers and underlying causes in the case of financing the CSDP.

Terpan's three problems and issues identified within the network of finance is a surmision thorough content analysis and interviews have found the most relevant issues to be:

- Lack of resources
- Lack of coherence and consistency
- Lack of democratic control

Each of Terpan's issues will be outlined, after which they will be applied to Moravcsik Three-Stage analysis, where we examine the national preferences, the substantive bargaining and choice of institutions that influence the actors within financial processes.

Budgetary restrains is one factor which is causing issues within military integration of the EU. The increasing cost of sending military troops and hardware across borders, has especially proven to be an issue within the CSDP integration. A factor in this development has been the economic crisis of 2008-2009 (Terpan 2015). Apart from that, the budgetary restrains is not only confined to financial problems, related to the collapse of the market. Political prioritization has also presents several issues. As mentioned earlier, vertical fragmentation allows for member states to determine their own participation in financing of CSDP activities. A growing reluctance to prioritize military and defensive capabilities has caused a rise in member states opting out of the financing processes. Even the Athena-mechanism, although permanent and created with the intention of expediting military operations, has proven insufficient. The HR's role in financing decisions of the CSDP is limited - in the end, member states are the ones who decide how funding is provided. HR impacts this process, as she is the one who classifies the nature of an operation (be it military or defensive), but member states have to agree on the sources of funding, resulting in lengthy intergovernmental negotiations. Since Athena only covers about ten to fifteen percent of operations, the

financing will go through member-states, making them hesitant to commit to operations (ibid).

Considering the implications of the budgetary restrictions, we gain an insight to the most prevalent motivations that goes behind national preferences in the financial processes. On the area of funding the CSDP, we can chalk up the main incitements as being of a economic and political nature.

The EU is constituted of many states, which all have widely different economic backgrounds. Some can definitely be said to have a decisively more stable economy than others, which naturally has a comprehensive influence on the member states willingness to engage in financing military operations. The considerable cost such operations, combined with the volatile market tendencies post 2009, has brought with it a reluctance amongst member states in the sense that military operations are not perceived as a imminent priority (ibid). Before 2009 crisis, a higher degree of dedication towards military programs was observable, but at the moment, FAC is finding it hard to justify funding towards CSDP to their constituencies. Instead, the focus of budgetary decision-making has been increasingly internalized and now focuses more on stabilizing the EU economy (ibid). Another factor, which also defines the motivations of states in financial matters of the CSDP is their national preferences. The decision basis of national preferences, can be further divided into geopolitical relevance and ideological conceptions. The geopolitical relevance is reflected in the countries which would be most likely to make use of the CSDP due to their geographical locations. The vertical fragmentation brings with it the opportunity for member states to opt out if they desire to do so, and the location of an operation can make it irrelevant for some actors to participate. Ideological preferences derives from a nation's willingness to engage in military activities, based on their predisposition towards the use of force. Some member states will be disinclined to finance missions if there exists a diplomatic alternative to military action. Germany is the biggest economy in the EU. One that basis, one could assume that their spending would surpass that of smaller states with more restricted budgets. However, Germany resides in a stable geographical area, so on a national states level, they have no push to engage with military activities. Germany also have a considerable pacifistic attitude.

So what we can say about the national preferences on basis of financing of the CSDP, is that there can be observed a domestic pressure, as a result of the 2009 financial

crises, for a political prioritization, that do not favour financing of the CSDP. We can observe, that states can prioritize financing the CSDP, only if there exists ideological or geopolitical preferences for it.

The lack of coherence and consistency is based in the horizontal fragmentation. Within CSDP activities, multiple mechanisms of financing is available depending on the nature of the activity. Civilian activities draw on the union budget through supranational instances. Military activities are able to draw on member state 'cost fall where they lie'-principle and the Athena mechanism for financing. Each different type of financing will have different processes and actors involved, and the processes may vary greatly in the amount of time it requires to pass a budget. These different structures are however based upon vague definitions of what actually constitutes a 'civilian' or 'military' activity. As of yet, this distinction has still to be made and no official characterizations exists. This makes it up to the HR to define operations on a case to case basis. The different structures available combined with blurred lines between the various categorizations, allows for actors to exploit structural loopholes. For an instance, civilian activities will from time to time make use of the Athena-mechanism or the 'cost fall where they lie'-principle to be able pass financing without involvement of union budget, avoiding scrutiny from the EP. However, this lack of coherence and consistency also represents some structural issues, especially when it comes to activities with civilian as well as military characteristics; these are especially vulnerable to actor induced stalling as they can be financed through a lot of different channels. Member states sometimes chose to slow down funding processes due to the fact that they disagree on how missions should be financed - however, this delay can have a direct impact on the efficacy of operations (although they more often just represent a bureaucratic headache).

The culmination of horizontal and vertical fragmentation can be seen as the basis for the state's substantive bargaining in the area of financing the CSDP. The structural flexibility and the actors' ability to maneuver it, gives them a certain degree of relative bargaining power, namely through the threat of non-cooperation. In financial decisions of the CSDP, member states who bear the costs of an operation will often stand the weakest in negotiations as they will have to compromise the most in order to engage other nations to participate. Substantive bargaining also takes shape in the form of

member states ability to engage with alternative coalitions, namely through NATO. Financing in NATO is mostly done through a collective funding - either directly through member state contributions to NATO (two percent of the country's GDP) or through 'common'/'joint' funding (Funding NATO, 2014). These mechanisms are less likely to leave considerable sums of funding to individual member-states, making it preferable to CSDP military activities.

The last issue Terpan points out is the **lack of democratic control and accountability**. This issues is not something that has a direct impact on the efficacy of operations, but it does raise some ethical questions towards the processes. Missions of a civilian nature will undergo processes in the EP, where representatives from member states will be able to scrutinize and participate in processes. Missions with a military nature goes through different instances, in which the member states are more separated from the processes. Member States are ultimately the ones that sign of on budgets, but eg. the Athena mechanism is especially said to have a deficit of democratic control and oversight. States are partly able to control some processes on a national level, as it is within their respective governments that the quantity of their contributions are determined. However, since Athena is only available for CSDP missions, the EP is not entitled to inspect the CSDP's use of budget. Member states are as such accountable to their own parliaments, but can not hold the Council liable. This means that neither national nor the European parliament can scrutinize military financial processes.

This lack of democratic control and accountability can once again be traced back to the horizontal fragmentation of the CSDP. Through this dichotomy of activities (either being of civilian or military nature), member states of the CSDP are able to adjust their choice of institutions, depending on what would benefit their situation the most.

The barriers that are observable in the area of financing the CSDP are numerous, but the following, can be pointed out as the most influential:

- The national preferences show an overall lack of political prioritisation from the member states.
- There is a loophole in the institutional way of financing, since that by declaring the actions as either civilian or military, it is possible for the states, to either speed up the process, slow it down or make it downright impossible.

- Furthermore, the lack of democratic control in the area, underpins its intergovernmental nature, which makes it a less likeable institutional choice of the states, for financing their military actions.

The European Defence Agency

In this section the European Defence Agency, its goals, role and functions within the CSDP will be outlined. Firstly, the reason for analysing the EDA as a vital element in understanding the obstacles facing EU military integration and what cause them, will be described. Secondly, the nature EDA as an intergovernmental institution and the problem it faces for achieving its self-described goals and the goals put forth in the EP resolution of 22nd November will be identified and outlined and the obstacles, challenges and problems, that the EDA faces will be analysed applying Liberal Intergovernmentalism as an analytical framework. This will be done in order to understand the nature of these problems that makes military integration difficult and what cause them.

Why the EDA?

The EDA is an intergovernmental institution that operate within the CSDP area. It is vital to the defence, security and integration in the EU, because its principal tasks are to facilitate armaments cooperation, harmonise defence capabilities development, identifying the capability needs for the CSDP, consolidating and streamlining the European defence technological and industrial base, promoting defence research and cooperation and coordinate armaments procurement and production in Europe (Norheim-Martinsen 2013).

The EDA is essential if military integration is to succeed, because it is the facilitates the cooperation between the states through joint capability programmes, research programmes and agreements on defence market regulations (Fiott 2015). These are all things that further defence resource pooling and cooperation.

The resolution from the EP, the 22nd of November 2016 on the European Defence Union heavily emphasizes the role of EDA, if defence integration is to happen effectively and with success. It is clear that the EP sees the EDA as precondition for an

effective Defence Union that reduces costs and enables the EU to have strategic independent Defence Union by coordination capability programmes and establishing a common capacity and defence materiel policy. The EP is adamant that the strength and role of the EDA has to increase (EP/2052/2016).

The EP emphasises the need for all EU-member states to participate in and support the EPA if the agency its reach the its overall goals. (EP/2052/2016).

What is the EDA?

The EDA is an intergovernmental EU agency under the FAC and operates in liaison with the Commission and its overall goal is to *“to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities(..)”* (EDA 2017).

The EDA was established by a joint action initiated by the Foreign Affairs Council in 2004 as an intergovernmental EU agency with the goal of providing better coordination and harmonisation of defence cooperation among the EU member states within the framework of CSDP. The creation of EDA only became a reality when key states converged their preferences in this area. It was only when the UK finally agreed to a french proposal for establishing a body that dealt with armaments and defence procurement cooperation (Chappel and Petrov 2012).

It was agreed that the EDA should not only be an armaments agency focusing on defence procurement, but a capabilities agency that brings together development, procurement and establish the political framework for integrated coordinated European armaments projects. Key is, that this political framework naturally will have a political nature in the sense that states participating in the EDA are subject to directions and evaluations towards fulfilling their individual capability commitments.

In short, the key functions of the EDA are as follows:

- To identify and evaluate common military capability objectives;
- To promote the harmonisation of operational needs and the adoption of procurement methods;
- To propose multilateral projects and ensure the coordination of the respective

programmes;

- To support and coordinate EU level defence research and development activities;
- To improve the effectiveness of military expenditure within the EU;
- To identify measures for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector (Chappel and Petrov 2012).

The EDA has 27 participating member states as of today – Denmark is not participating because of its opt out in the defence area. Naturally Brexit means, that the UK will be out of EDA in the near future. The EDA is under the authority of the FAC which consists of the foreign ministers or their representatives from the participating states – it operates strictly within the framework provided by FAC. (Chappel and Petrov 2012). The EDA steering board is chaired by the HR – who is responsible for the overall functioning of the EDA. The members of the EDA steering board are the member states defence ministers. The decisions the board makes are implemented by the Chief Executive who is appointed by the HR.

The EDA personnel consists of national experts and currently there are more than 4,000 experts employed. It also currently provides the strategic framework for the implementation of more than 50 projects, some worth hundreds of millions of euros. The projects are implemented by different constellations of member states and all stride towards the aforementioned goals. (EDA 2017).

Even though the FAC decisions on EDA operational rules are made by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), it is still fundamentally an intergovernmental body. The mandate given to the EDA by the FAC is only given with the approval the European Council, whose decisions are made with unanimity, and the mandates are largely delegated with the goal of producing and providing information to the states. Also adding the fact that the EDA is being governed by ministers or government representatives clearly underpins the intergovernmental nature of the EDA.

The EDA is best seen as an important facilitator that encourages the EU member states to participate in joint projects within the CSDP framework. Therefore, its role is very significant, because it facilitates a great deal of the practical operationalisation of the CSDP and is therefore an important key in fulfilling the potential for military

integration, the Lisbon Treaty dictates. Whether this potential is to be fulfilled depends on the member states motivation to fully work and participate in the EDA, its projects and accept its oversight and agenda.

What barriers does the EDA face in the pursuit European Military Integration?

This question will be answered by applying the Liberal Intergovernmentalism and its sequential Three-Stage Framework for understanding cooperation and integration. The barriers the EDA face will be identified and analysed under the what stage in the model they relate to. Finally, a conclusion will connect the dots and give an overall assessment of the challenges that the EDA faces and what cause them.

National preferences

The EDA faces a lot of different problems that stem from ideological, historical and geographical factors, shaping different preferences in the defence area amongst EU member states. One of the central issues for the EDA in this regard pertains to the division amongst member states preference for pooled defence resources, championed by the EDA, or the preference for national defence sovereignty, which traditionally has been very important for nations states (Bátora 2009).

Many states have traditionally seen the control of their military, their defence material and armaments acquisition as an exclusive prerogative of a sovereign nation state – this way, security is achieved through self-sufficiency and self-reliance. This preference is one of the reasons why the defence area has been exempt from the EU single market, resulting in big fragmentation of national armaments policies, structures and practices, becoming a big obstacle for the EDA to overcome. As Liberal Intergovernmentalism prescribes, the security area is dominated by a great amount of insecurity about upsides and downsides in cooperation, which make some states prone to adhere to the logic of defence sovereignty. As is the case with Denmark, making Denmark contest the level of cooperation and integration, that the EDA works towards. The uncertainty in the defence area makes it very vulnerable to ideological preferences from governments and heads of state, which means that shifting governments can complicate the integration process. Especially if elected leaders have nationalistic and/or an eurosceptic ideology that deter them from giving up any sovereignty.

Pooled defence resources would add value through increasing cost effectiveness and increase sustainability and transparency, but the preference for defence sovereignty is still dominant in the EU member states. This is one of the main reasons why member states have not gone very far in the process of utilising the resources, the EDA gives them. Instead they prefer to rely largely on their national programmes, which in many cases overlap. (Chappel & Petrov 2012). If some member states wholly abstain from giving up defence sovereignty, causing a number of EU member state to permanent opt out of the EDA, it would render the operationalisation of the EDA as good as impossible because it relies on Member State support. This would almost certainly mean that the CSDP-project would be largely unsuccessful. The division between the preferences for pooled resources and defence sovereignty thereby pose a substantial threat to the entire concept of EU military integration.

Another division in states preferences that challenges the EDA is the preference for either Atlantic or European cooperation in the field of armaments production, joint capability projects and pooling defence resources. The Europeanist preference is that EU security policy is to be developed within the EU and the key participants in the security and defence field are EU member states – therefore joint capability programmes and arms acquisitions are to be done among the member states. The Atlanticist preference is that security policy is best developed among NATO allied, NATO allies is to play a great role in the European Defence area and that NATO allies are part of joint defence and acquisition programmes (Bátora 2009). Atlanticist preferences among member states can lead to weak political backing of the EDA because of a non-convergence of preferences regarding defence production, procurement and cooperation (Chappel & Petrov 2012). Examples of member states with Atlanticist approaches are Denmark, Poland, The Netherlands and most importantly France. Despite actually supporting the EDA, Poland has traditionally bought American military equipment (Chappel & Petrov 2012) and wants to enhance the cooperation with NATO and at the same time engage in the CSDP (Jankowski 2015).

France is a part of NATO's integrated command structure and the country have had numerous military deployments, especially in North Africa, which has driven them further away from the CSDP. Furthermore, France has signed simpler and more, in its

opinion, effective bilateral defence and security treaties with the UK, whom both have greater willingness to deploy troops abroad. Moreover, France and the US are historically close allies and cooperate military with the US across North Africa (Gomis 2015). All things that steer France away from a commitment to the EDA programmes and result in weak political backing from Paris. Given that France is a key factor in the EDA in that it is the greatest military power of all EU states, its preference for Atlanticist policies is a great threat to the EDA. France furthermore has a very different approach to the use of force than another key European actor, Germany. The problem being, that it is all well and good to do joint capability programmes, but if member states can not agree on how the capabilities should be used, the political backing will suffer.

The problems stem from countries preferences for a Regional or Global approach and a Pro-active or Restrictive approach to the use of force. Regional versus Global approach refers to the preference for a focus on either regional defence and regional interest or a global defence preference that see countries have a strong military presence outside Europe. These are interests stem from countries geographical placement and ideology which especially define their willingness to deploy forces outside Europe. Pro-active versus Restrictive use of force refers to member states preference for using force and when they deem it necessary – some have few restrictions some have a lot. (Chappel & Petrov 2012). These divergences are especially clear in the case of France, who has a Global approach to the use of force and a great willingness to deploy force outside its borders – and they are willing to act independently from EU-programmes in doing so (Gomis 2015). In contrast, Germany has restrictions to the use of force and a more regional approach to defence which naturally leads to difficulties in agreeing on the use of the joint capabilities. The EDA provides a great opportunity for joint capability development, but the states preferences differ when it comes to when and where these capabilities are to be deployed, which leads to weak political backing of the EDA from some member states – such as France – who has their own defence agenda. These differing agendas, outlooks and preferences, especially when it comes to relinquishing national armaments programmes and defence sovereignty, all present great and fundamental challenges for the EDA – that is why common strategic defence culture amongst EU member states need to further developed if the EDA – one that satisfies each member states individual

preferences and maximises their utility, taking the unique circumstances that surround each member state into account.

Substantive Bargaining

In the effort to further assess the challenges to EU integration, the next step is to look at the relations of bargaining power that stem from the member states national preferences.

The issue of relative bargaining as it pertains to the EDA is especially relevant in the relationship between France and Germany, who are the two nations with the greatest military power and capabilities in the EU, if you exclude the UK, who will be out of the European Union in the near future. France and Germany have very different preferences when it comes to security and defence policies as discussed in the last section.

Germany do not see the CSDP strictly as a military alliance, but as a framework for policy coordination and a tool for harmonising capability developments and eventually as a way for the EU to gain independence from US policies and capabilities – this is to be done through intergovernmental policy coordination in which the EDA plays an important role (Linnenkamp 2015).

The CSDP and the EDA is an essential component of German foreign policy, so much so, that there is no foreign and defence policy that it separated from the context of Europe – it is what defines it. To most Germans, a European Germany comes before any notion of strict national interest – the European Germany in an integrated capable Europe is the national interest of Germany (Linnenkamp 2015).

This stands in a sharp contrast to France, because where the German focus is regional, restrictive and on European independence, the French focuses are global and pro-active and they prefer to act pragmatically and independently from the EU, thus steering clear of any ideological and institutional debates. Furthermore, France sees the EDA and the benefits it could bring as a supplement to their own national interest (Gomies 2015). In short, many of the challenges, the EDA in achieving its goals as

described relates to which one of these nations has the greatest relative bargaining power, thus either moving the EDA forward as a common European joint capabilities program or as an agency that is kept at has a relatively low degree of integration and with few commitments, serving the sole purpose of helping the nation states individual interests and global ambition, which would most certainly render it useless in achieving its aspired goals for common European military capabilities.

France has a substantial amount of bargaining power for a number of reasons. Firstly, they have the greatest military force in Europe – which means that they have a lot to gain from making a threat of non-cooperation, since they have a very strong capability for pursuing unilateral policies. France has the capabilities to pursue unilateral policies that satisfies the demands for action, that stems from their national interest. France also gains the least from changing the status quo, because more integration would most likely impair their ability to act independently and pursue unilateral policies. Germany is arguably the most do dominant actor in European Cooperation, but Germany is very reluctant to use military force actively, which could see France move further away from the pooling of defence resources and only use the EDA to a purpose that maximizes their own utility without limiting their possibility to act. Meaning that France will only use the EDA as a complementary agency, that provides training, advice, information and other helpful things, but they will opt out or veto, when and if their utility is limited. Secondly, France has many options when it comes to making alternative coalitions that further enhances their bargaining power. They have in NATO, the US and the UK strong alternative alliances that may prone France to steer clear of the CSDP framework, because these alternative alliances satisfy their unilateral policies better. France has common interest with the US in North Africa, they are a part of the permanent command structure in NATO and they have bilateral pooling arrangements the UK, who has the same Pro-active defence approach as they do.

Germany has a relatively week amount of bargaining power compared to France, since they are committed to a restrictive and regional approach to defence and security and because they are committed to the European project. This means, that their ability to make the treat of alternative coalitions is almost non-existent – their coalition

partners are the European nations. Germany also will have great difficulties in pressuring France through the threat of exclusion, since France has such great military capabilities, that it would leave the EDA and the entire CSDP virtually pointless without them. Therefore, a situation with status quo is maintained is highly likely – which would mean that the EDA would not see any further integration, more ambitious projects or commitments. Germany cannot pressure France towards more integration because of their relative weak bargaining powers, but the threat of exclusion would see the end to the CSDP-project and the hope for a defence union. Because the EDA framework is relies on unanimity, the states who do not see the benefit for cooperation will naturally oppose such propositions, which poses a great problem when there is almost certainly countries who feel that they do not gain by cooperating.

If the EDA is going to be successful, Germany would need to be successful in creation of circumstances, that would make it worthwhile for France to change the status quo. Or if France lost their bargaining power, seeing the benefits and the utility that the EDA would bring, giving them an incentive to participate. This could happen if France would accept commitments from the EDA, because the capabilities that the EDA supplies enhances their utility more than the status quo. But as things stand, asymmetry in bargaining power between Germany and France pose a great threat to the realization of the goals of the EDA.

Institutional Choice

The member states choose to engage cooperation through international institutions to the extent that it serves their national preferences and increase their substantive bargaining power. As The-Three stage framework for integration prescribes, the key motivation for states to engage with international institutions is that they want to reduce their transaction course, and that the institutional choice is also preferable when the status quo is unattractive – in times of war or great uncertainty or if or when a unilateral policy is impossible or unattractive.

Member states participation in the EDA can be explained by their interest in reducing transaction cost in and the defence and security area, an area that is riddled with uncertainty – a participation that allows them share information, coordinate activities and have norms and procedures that can help reduce the uncertainty.

However, if states are going to go so far as to relinquish sovereignty by pooling resources and commit to supranational regulations, the status quo needs to be unacceptable and the institution needs to provide effective external representation, be able to set an agenda and enforce it.

The EDA do not offer external representation since it is a European internal capabilities program. In terms of agenda-setting, the national preferences that are in play in the area that the EDA operates diverge a great deal and are full different approaches to defence and security – there is no broad consensus, which is why the EDA is still dominated by an intergovernmental logic. This is why the EDA is not able to enforce any rules and laws in a supranational manner – They EDA thus becomes an organisation that states will participate in, because it reduces their cost of transaction by providing optional cooperation, information and an arena for networking. The consequence of for the EDA of being directly answerable to Member States is that the cooperation and programmes that the EDA push will have little or weak backing when it influences national security and national-economic matters (Fiott 2014)

The goals of the EDA to create a common European Defence industry and the pooling of Defence Resources is greatly challenged by this, because many states would have to participate on a deeper level to achieve the interoperability that this requires. The EDA currently does many programmes on a voluntary basis with clusters of different Member States participating. But when it comes to streamlining defence capabilities and pool resources throughout the European Union, the EDA, along with the rest of the CSDP-project, is greatly challenged by the risk of ending up as a lowest common denominator project, where the willingness of the least willing participating Member State to engage with cooperation and pooling sets the framework for the entire cooperation.

The differences of interest that causes this therefore pose a great challenge to the effectiveness of the EDA – which, if the lowest common dominator sets the framework, is not very effective. If the states are happy with the status quo, they are not in any way likely to change it if it does not serve their utility, which can help explain why integration in the defence-area has proofed so difficult.

The Member States preferences in the Defence area has meant that the institutional setup of the EDA remains fundamentally intergovernmental, which makes it more vulnerable to the danger of appealing to the lowest common denominator, resulting in a very narrow framework for cooperation, which would make it ineffective, thus leaving it incapable in the effort of achieving its goals.

Summary

The EDA faces a great amount of obstacles in its way towards reaching the potential for defence and security integration, that the Lisbon treaty allows for. Divergent preferences amongst member states approach to defence and security, their unequal relations of bargaining power and the institutional setup of the agency are all significant barriers on the road towards integration, that need to be overcome if the EDA is to be successful.

Battlegroups

The Helsinki Headline goal 2003 issued that member states should be able to contribute to rapid response, having troops ready to deploy at short notice (European Union External Action 2013). This goal eventually evolved into the controversial battlegroups. - Ready-to-be-deployed battalions and under the command of the EU (ibid.). These battlegroups have never been put into action in their 10 year long lifespan, while the EU has contributed with joint actions, since the battlegroups reached full capability in 2007 (ibid.). A major point of interest in the studies of the CFSP, the aversion to using the battlegroups will be a point of analysis in this paper and analysed below.

We will analyse the discrepancy explained above, by looking at potential situations where a deployment could have been a possibility. The two examples of potential deployment will be Libya in 2011 when a no-fly zone was created by the United Nations Security Council and the EU did not participate with the battlegroups, while Great Britain and France were leading actors, and in the Central African Republic in 2013-2014, when conflicts rose due to religious differences between Christians and Muslims, two instances where the United Nation Security Council operated without the help of the EU, in the form of battlegroups, but contributed otherwise. Last I will look at

the acclaimed 'Nordic Battlegroup' as an example of a better functioning cooperation as there are clear geo-political reasons for nations in the region to cooperate militarily.

The focus of this analysis will be actor-focused like our other analyses, but with a larger focus on the institutional choice and the national choice. As the battlegroups have never been deployed, the substantive bargaining has never led to any fruitful decisions for the battlegroups, and therefore we will not be emphasizing using it in the analysis.

Due to the secret surroundings concerning the discussions and decision-making in both the United Nations Security Council [UNSC] and FAC of the European Union, this analysis will rely upon knowledge from second-hand sources to determine the different states involvement, commitment and drive in the above-mentioned political arenas. As there is little real geo-political fear of war within the nation states in the EU, this analysis will have a heightened importance on general trends of nation states, such as the pacifist view of Germany, and the impact military actions has in countries such as Great Britain and France (Reykers, 2016).

The potential deployments:

During the Libyan revolution in March, 2011, The UNSC adopted Resolution 1973; A "No-Fly Zone" over Libya was established as an answer to the atrocities and "crimes against humanity" conducted by the Qadhafi regime against the civilians of Libya, and to promote a ceasefire within the country (UNSC/RES/1973). This debate was spearheaded by the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, whom, according to (UNSC/RES/1973), said *"that the urgent need to protect the civilian population had led to the elaboration of the current resolution, which authorized the Arab League and those Member States wishing to do so to take all measures to protect areas that were being threatened by the Qadhafi regime."* The resolution was voted through with 10 in favor and 5 abstentions from Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russian Federation. Thus 2 EU member states deliberately elected to participate in a military action (United Kingdom and France, as the two European permanent members), and Germany whom abstained from voting - an act we will get back to further on in the analysis. This is the playing field for the analysis of the first instance where the battlegroups potentially could have been deployed.

Libya

To understand the non-involvement of the battlegroups in the Libyan conflict, and more so in the no-fly zone by the UNSC, we will approach this by looking at the three actors mentioned above, first and foremost. The actors of UK, France and Germany accepted the use of military force from the UNSC, but why did they not choose to use battlegroups instead?

To determine this, we will put the decisions made by the nation states through the paces of our analysis. First step will be to determine the national preferences, as outlined in our theory chapter. The nations in question, whom participated in the UNSC operation, will be the main focus in the analysis of the response to Qadhafi and the Libya situation. According to (Menon 2011) both France and UK are military-happy nations, whom have a history and desire to take action on an international level. As stated in our operationalization on national preferences, the ideology of a nation is a highly important factor in the national preferences. This is reflected in the case of intervention in Libya, where some of the leading voices for intervention was UK and France (Reykers 2016 & UNSC/RES/2127). This coincides with the picture Menon paints in (Menon 2011), which leaves us with Germany, a nation-state described as *"a state at best hesitant about many ESDP interventions"* and *"Germany, which pays most under the GDP scale, has become increasingly sensitive to the costs of missions in areas it does not consider political priorities."* (Menon, 2011) as an actor to analyze upon. Germany's ideology is highlighted both in (Menon, 2011) and (Reykers, 2016) as a pacifist state. This is supported by their absence from voting in the UNSC resolution concerning the no-fly zone, as they do not display the same affection for military intervention in Libya. (It must be duly noted that an abstention is an acceptance of the resolution).

So outside the national ideologies of France, UK and Germany, what other preferences are in play in the commitment to the UNSC, and in turn, the non-commitment to the EU and an insertion of the battlegroups? First of all, why the commitment to intervene in the first place, outside the ideologies of UK and France? According to the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France became the 2nd largest importer from Libya in 2014, whereas 99% of the import was crude oil (Diplomatie.gouv.fr. 2017). This is not a definitive motive for France, but it speaks in great favor of being a national preference for France to stabilize Libya, as oil is a greatly valued resource and it has a large impact on national preferences. According to

(Miskimmon 2012) oil was a major contributor for the involvement of the UK as well. The dependence of Libyan oil created national preferences for both countries to stabilize the situation, and for the country to return to normal, thus leading to their large involvement in the discussions within the UNSC. So both countries have specific economic reasons to engage, but what about geo-political reasons? As mentioned several times in the resumé from the UNSC resolution 1973, Libya was a part of the Arab spring which, according to the resumé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed as: *“said the world was experiencing “a wave of great revolutions that would change the course of history”, as people throughout North Africa and the Middle East were calling for “a breath of fresh air”, for freedom of expression and democracy”*(UNSC/RES/1973). Geographically speaking, Libya is not close to either UK nor France, but it is indeed close to the European Union, only separated by the Mediterranean Sea. So while neither France or the UK has any particular geopolitical reasons to partake, the European Union as a Union and not a political arena, would have geo-political reasons to intervene, but still failed to do so.

Second part of the liberal intergovernmental analysis framework is the substantive bargaining. Through substantive bargaining we can understand the asymmetrical power relations, which are skewering the decision making process of the battlegroups. Through the three dynamics shown in theory chapter of substantive bargaining, we can how the positions of power influences the outcome.

As Menon says: *“As an unnamed European diplomat put it, the European Union could, relatively easily, have deployed naval patrols to police an arms embargo against Muammar Qaddafi, as NATO did after a few days of deliberation, but ‘the truth is that if we tried, we would have taken three months, not three days to agree an operational plan”* (Menon, 2011. Pg. 83). The European Union's response has been anything but rapid, and this is of course leading back to the battlegroups, as their response units. Due to the ‘Athena mechanism’ Menon, as he explains *“makes provision for some ‘common costs’ (about 10% of overall mission cost), whereby all member states contribute on the basis of GDP. Yet not only does this still leave contributors to pick up the bulk of the expenses, it also renders some member states even less anxious to see deployments occur. Germany, which pays most under the GDP scale, has become increasingly sensitive to the costs of missions in areas it does not consider political priorities.”* (Menon, 2011, p 83). Several countries does not want to contribute and in the case of Germany, they both have a large

economical commitment and a pacifist view. As they stand to lose the most from deviating from status quo, they have the 'strongest' bargaining position in being the status quo. On the opposite end of the spectrum the US has great bargaining power in NATO and the UN: *"The NATO framework also provides a degree of confidence that the United States will be at hand if things go badly wrong"* (ibid.). The US offers more security and they had a strong voice in implementation *"and the USA would not have supported the EU taking the lead, given their explicit urge for NATO to lead both the air and the naval campaign"*. (Reykers 2016). These factors played in the decision to use other institutions. To further 'add insult to injury', the battlegroup in question for deployment at the time where, according to (ibid.), consisting of troops from Germany, Austria, Lithuania and Finland (ibid.), which further hinders deployment due to the pacifism of Germany. Therefore it only seems rational to move the discussions of troops deployment to other institutions, which are not dragged down by limiting framework, and where actors in status quo are less influential. This leads us to the institutional choice.

The institutional choice is the last point of analysis, and in the case of Libya. As the nation's actively chose to use different institutions than the EU and their battlegroups, we will focus largely on why these choices were made. As shown in our first part of the Libya analysis, both the UK and France had plenty of incentives for military intervention within Libya, but ultimately, the mission was decided upon, and carried out in the UNSC, instead of the European Union.

As mentioned in the substantive bargaining section above, the US had a strong voice in the discussion within the UNSC, and rightfully so; they presented the other nations with security and, as prescribed through institutional choice in liberal intergovernmentalism, less uncertainty and a lessened chance of unwanted consequences as they took charge and through the NATO framework existed as a safety net for the parties involved (Menon, 2011, p 87). The US therefore created a more attractive institutional choice for the UNSC and NATO than the EU and the battlegroups. They also had an advantage, which created almost impossible conditions for an EU led operation: *"the French knew well that they would not have been able to unfold without American drones and intelligence, so they had to go through NATO"* and added that *"they could not use the EU" for these tasks"* (Reykers, 2016, p 353). As the relative bargaining power of Germany hinders the use of European military force, the US entice states to

participate in 'their' institutions (the UN and NATO), which has led to the outcome of the Libya crisis we see today.

CAR

In December 2012 a group called Séléka emerged in the Central African Republic (CAR). Séléka was a muslim dominated anti-government group that targeted "the Christian population and supporters of Bozizé" (Welz, 2014)- Bozizé, the president at the time. In March 2013 Séléka overthrew the government and the following fights left 2,3 million people, 48% of the total population in need of humanitarian help. This crisis led to a military response from France consisting of 1,000 troops on top of already-deployed troops securing the Bangui Airport, according to 3, through the UNSC Resolution 2127. This "explicitly provided France with a legitimation "to take all necessary measures" in support of MISCA" (Reykers, 2016 & UNSC/RES/2127). (MISCA being a UN supported mission, consisting of "of 5,097 soldiers and 602 police from 10 African countries, along with a substantive civilian component dealing with such issues as human rights, disarmament, gender, humanitarian liaison and political affairs" (Misca.peaceau.org, 2014)). France themselves have 2,000 soldiers deployed under another operation called 'Sangaris Operation'. Finally the EU did reach an agreement to deploy military troops, but only in 2014, called "EUFOR RCA" (Reykers, 2016), and as Reykers says: "Yet, EUFOR RCA could neither be described as a rapid response, given that it was deployed in April and it took until June to reach full operational capacity, nor did it make use of the EU Battlegroups (EEAS, Factsheet, 17 September 2014). " (Reykers, 2016), p 357). So why did the EU not use their ready-to-deploy, rapid response battlegroups?

To understand this, we will put our actors, namely France and the opposition of using battlegroups through our theoretical framework. The national preferences starts with France and their connection to CAR. Their foreign ministry's website *France Diplomatie* (<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/central-african-republic/france-and-the-central-african-republic/>) states that France is the only European country to have an embassy in CAR, and their long line of history. CAR was under French colonization until around 1960. Therefore they are are geopolitical importance to France, whom are heavily invested in CAR, and is largest investor in the

country (Diplomatie.gouv.fr., 2017). As we mention in our theory, geopolitical concerns are of high importance and France has the strongest ideologist opinion on the matter. Within the EU the desire for intervention is shown, and in December the European council said: *“the EU’s willingness to examine the use of relevant instruments to contribute towards the efforts under way to stabilise the country, including under the CSDP, in both its military and civilian dimensions”* (Reykers, 2016). But as in the case of Libya, leading countries in the battlegroups that were on standby at the time, had financial doubt concerning deployment. First Great Britain, according to an interview in (ibid.): *A high-level EEAS official summarised this as follows: we thought about the Battlegroup in the end of 2013; we started prudent planning. We received a relative good reaction from the London Military Staff, but that ended quickly. The political side in Downing Street 10 gave a robust “no”, for mostly domestic reasons. (Interview 10)*. Further on (ibid.) explains this is to do with financial reasons due to the Athena principle which is costly, and due to *“internal considerations, being a fear by the Conservatives to unnecessarily provide grist to the eurosceptics’ mill, and a more general strategic culture which sees the use of hard military power as a NATO prerogative (Interview 10).”* (Reykers, 2016, p 358).

For the implementation of the EUFOR RCA in, the battlegroups were once again in consideration (ibid.). But, according to Reykers, once again a leading country in the battlegroup that were standby at the time, had financial doubts concerning deployment: *“Second, and more important, involved decision-makers confirmed that EU Battlegroup deployment was once again obstructed by the lead country of the EU’s standby force, Greece (which led the “Balkan Battlegroup” for the period January–June 2014).”* (Reykers, 2016, p 358). So once again, the national preferences controls the faith of the battlegroups, and once again, the financial backing creates national doubt within a leading nation for the battlegroup: *“An involved Greek EU delegate explained this situation as follows: “it was Greece’s turn in the CAR, but the national public opinion would not accept Greece fighting in the CAR; and there is also the financial argument, of course”, hence concluding that “the government would do everything to avoid it” (Interview 20).”* (ibid, p 358).

As shown above, the national preferences, both economically as seen in both situations, and either an ideological (*“a more general strategic culture which sees the use of hard military power as a NATO prerogative (Interview 10).”* (ibid, p 358)), or internal public pressure (*“but the national public opinion would not accept Greece fighting in the*

CAR” (ibid., p 358)) are barriers for the use of battlegroups, which leaves very little leverage for the use of battlegroups, which is furthermore represented in the substantive bargainings.

The substantive bargainings starts with the same principles as Libya; Threat of non-cooperation. As Germany was capable of affecting the Libyan discussions by non-cooperation, and thereby gaining bargaining power by having significant leverage for status-quo, so have both Great Britain and Greece in the case of CAR. Due to the unanimity voting on CSDP operations, the threat of non-cooperation has creates a significant leverage for the adherents of status-quo in discussions, by giving more power to the nay-sayers through the right of veto. And this is reflected in the discussions of battlegroups as the leading countries within the battlegroups of the time, put a stop to the discussions, according to 3. On top of the non-cooperation, France themselves were able to create a unilateral policy within CAR, through the UNSC resolution 2127 that basically gave France *carte blanche* for military support in CAR (Reykers, 2016). This ability to implement unilateral policies within the area, gives France a relatively large bargaining power, as stated in our theory concerning unilateral policies, but for the sake of battlegroups, this bargaining power has little real impact on battlegroups. As the power of veto once again “vetoes” the use, the French can only turn to other arenas for support.

This leads to our institutional choice analysis of the CAR operations. Whereas the institutional choice concerning Libya was seemingly straight forward for the actors involved (France, Great Britain and Germany), as an interview in (Reykers, 2016) explains: *“key officials from the EEAS agreed that “the French knew well that they would not have been able to unfold without American drones and intelligence, so they had to go through NATO” and added that “they could not use the EU” for these tasks (Interviews 1 and 22). In addition, there was actually no consensus among EU members on the use of force for implementing both tasks (Miskimmon 2012, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014)”* (p 353). While Libya was a ‘less important’ cause of intervention and did not create a unitary demand for action, CAR created responses throughout the international community. The EU council already in december 2013 stated: *“the EU’s willingness to examine the use of relevant instruments to contribute towards the efforts under way to*

stabilise the country, including under the CSDP, in both its military and civilian dimensions” (European Council Conclusions, 19/20 December 2013, para. 46)”, according to (Reykers, 2016, p 357). The significance of this is, of course the institutional environment in which a potential deployment of battlegroups could be decided. Unlike Libya, the council were early in agreement to discuss participation, leading to France considering the use of battlegroups: “Interviews confirmed that a European intervention through the EU Battlegroups was already considered within the EU, by France more in particular, at the end of 2013.”(Reykers, 2016, p 357). The institutional choice for rapid deployment of troops for France, did end up through a unilateral policy through the UNSC ,as described above, due to the national preferences of Great Britain. This made France seek greener institutional pastures, like the UNSC, and putting a hold to battlegroup discussion.

CAR is also somewhat of an exception for Europe and the CSDP, as a mission was decided upon: “On 10 February 2014, the EU Council decided to deploy a military ground operation, EUFOR RCA” (Reykers, 2016, p 357), and unlike Libya it was not an operation with asterisks, as the EUFOR Libya operation: “The EU Council’s decision on the creation of EUFOR Libya in support of humanitarian assistance operations of 1 April 2011 included the requirement that “any decision to launch the operation must be preceded by a request from OCHA” (Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP, para. 5). “ (Reykers, 2016, p 354). Something OCHA was reluctant with, according to 3. Instead the EU did deploy personnel in CAR - up towards 800 at its max, according to (Misca.peaceau.org, 2014), and consisting of large amount of French troops (Reykers, 2016). But the battlegroups were not even considered in December 2013, according to 3. As explained: “In addition to this rational calculation that working unilaterally would provide the fastest solution, a French military official also indicated a lack of belief in the EU Battlegroups, saying that “how can we use these battlegroups? As long as you do not have a process to do it rapidly, you cannot use it” (Interview 15). “(Reykers, 2016, p 359).

The battlegroups seemed to never be a real consideration for the institutional point, underlining the conundrum outlined in Libya. They simply are not fitting for the situations at hand, and as explained throughout the analysis, and a point 3 makes as well, the decisions in the EU council are not rapid, nor is any eventual deployment. This makes the use of battlegroups tough and a hard sell to the contributing nations. But first and foremost, the countries whom are contributing to the battlegroups standing by, are

not inclined to participate due to the costs of deployment. This coupled with national viewpoints - whether it be pacifism or a more NATO oriented focus, is the large reasons the battlegroups are not functioning well, and not contributing to military integration.

Summary of the analysis and final remarks.

In the following we will present a short summary of our analysis and then draw up the commonalities of the different analyzes. Our analyzes have defined specific actors, who is solely responsible in causing the lack of integration. Therefore, the summary will be presented on the basis of the three-stage-framework of our theory.

National preferences

There is not one overall national preference to point out, that throughout our analysis have been the main barrier for fulfilling the military integration. There may however be a pattern regarding the different approaches to international cooperation between France and Germany, where (in the matter of EDA) France is more globally-oriented and Germany is regionally-oriented. In regards to the battlegroups, Germany has a more pacifistic ideology and France is more open for interventions. Regarding the EDA, Germany's regional approach push for more integration and in the case of battlegroups, Germany's pacifist ideology push for de-facto less integration. Therefore these differences can not in themselves be used to point out underlying causes of the barriers of unfulfilled integration.

But they do hint at a bigger picture, which is that conflicting and dispersed national preferences are a cause of unfulfilled integration. This is also supported by the fact that UK and Greece's unwillingness to support the use of battlegroups in CAR, on the basis of a conflicting domestic prioritization. It is somewhat most observable in the case of financing, because the overall down prioritization of the CSDP on domestic level, further hinders the incentive across the states for more integration.

Substantive Bargaining

As was the case with National preferences, there are few clear commonalities to point out. Both in the case of EDA and the french intervention in CAR, France's strong military makes way for unilateral policy from their side, which was more preferable than the EU alternative. In the case of, both EDA and Libya, the relevant actors choose

alternative coalitions, partly facilitated by the US or NATO. This factor is connected with the matter of institutional choice, but still underpins the same point as with unilateral policy; there is no possibility for “pareto-improving” or “threat of exclusion”. States can not be forced into collaboration in the area of CSDP, by the negative externalisation created by chosen policy or ‘the threat of exclusion’. This is also the case with the financing of military operations, because the ‘cost lie where it falls’ principle and the reluctance of the ‘Athena mechanism’ secures that no state can be forced into paying for military actions, they do not favour.

As was the case with National preference, this is the broader point that can be made about Substantiv bargaining. There is no possibility of creating incentive for states to join a collaboration, if they prefer the status quo.

Institutional choice

On basis of our analysis, we can point to two factors that makes states chose different institutions, other than those provided by the CSDP. These are the lack of efficiency and credibility in the institution of the CSDP.

We can point to the fact, that the conflict embedded in defining the actions as either military or civilian, as a clear sign of lack of efficiency, because of this process being long and costly. NATO had, in the case of Libya, the capabilities, that made the operation possible and in the case of CAR, the battlegroups were not a possibility to use, these both being signs of inefficiency. This is also clear in the case of the EDA, where the lack of broad consensus and incompatible national preferences keeps it in a intergovernmental modus operandi, which greatly limits its effectiveness.

Because of the lack of credibility in CSDP-institutions, the states show great reluctance to use them. They do not see any credibility, especially in the case of financing. In the case of Libya, it is clear that the collaboration with the US, at the expense of the battlegroups, was chosen, because the US also brought a great deal of credibility to the table.

Conclusion

In this chapter we will conclude on our points found in the analysis. We will outline and clarify the underlying causes of the barriers, which have prevented a

fulfillment of the potential integration of the Lisbon treaty on the basis of our three chosen points of unfulfilled potentials.

As established in our summary of our analysis, it is not possible to point at one or more definitive actors who bear the sole responsibility for creating the barriers for further integration in the area of the CSDP. This is due to the fact that the three biggest actors (Germany, France and the UK), takes on different roles in different situations. In some cases they may promote more integration and in other cases they may hinder it. These unpredictable behavioral patterns, are a direct result of the CSDP area being of immensely comprehensive, containing a large range of different aspects.

This muddy picture is a clear consequence of intergovernmental playing field, that is the CSDP. In a more supranational setting, one could argue, that states would be forced to either be for or against further integration in the whole area of CSDP, while this intergovernmental setting, leaves room for the states to vote on the basis of their own preferences on case to case.

As concluded in the summary of the analysis, the conflict, that rises from the incompatible national preferences of the states, is a definite barrier for fulfilling the potential for further integration. This is of course not surprising, conflict of national preferences would by many analysis frameworks and especially by Liberal intergovernmentalism, always be a reason for non-cooperation in the EU. On the basis of the Parliament's resolution of 22nd november 2016 and our analysis, we can point to the existence of 'will' for further integration, but the incompatibility of the National preferences creates a demand for more comprehensive solutions. This have happen in a lot other areas, that the EU are now cooperating on. But what differs extensively on the of defence, is the unpredictability, which, as stated in our theory and analysis, makes room for the states ideologies to effect the stand of the state. We see this in the way Germany is reluctant for military operations, because of their pacifist and regional views and how France chooses the UN or NATO, to do actions, that correspond to their state ideology, that are Globally-oriented and more interventionist.

The lack of solutions could derive, from the fact, that it does not seem like, there is not any asymmetric substantive bargaining power relation, as found in our analysis,

of such a nature, that one state can force another, from status quo, the latter finds it more attractive. This most in many ways be looked at, as a result of either the musketeer oath of NATO or the solidarity clause of the Lisbon treaty. By effect of these two institutional instruments, any state of the EU, will always have the protection of the rest of the EU and in many cases also the US. Therefore there is little risk of become vulnerable, by not anticipating in military cooperation.

But this can of course not stand alone, as the sole reason, for not using the CSDP, and thereby furthering the military integration of the EU. That states persistently choose other institutions over the institutions of the CSDP, be they UN, NATO or just, as in the case with financing, merely calling it a civilian mission, to secure another way of financing it outside of the CSDP. As we have clarified in the distinctive analyzes and in the summary of the analyzes, we can point rather directly at the lack of efficiency and credibility of the CSDP. The question about credibility is connected to lack of efficiency and that there is few and often irrelevant examples of former CSDP missions, to give the institution's credibility. This realization leads to the question of why the CSDP is inefficient. Our theory, analysis and main academic sources all points toward the fact, that the CSDP is intergovernmental and ruled by unanimity voting. The unanimity vote, as mentioned early, is a clear reason, why status quo on the area of CSDP prevails time and time again. If just one state fear losses by changing status quo, they can veto the proposed policy. And as mentioned earlier, there is little possibility in the framework of the CSDP, to force other states to join in collaborations.

This leaves the CSDP in what could be described as a paradox. Since in almost all situations one of the 27 states involved in the CSDP is bound to prefer status quo over the proposed policy, which dictates, that in most instances, states have clear cases in mind or memory, where they favoured status quo. This means, that when further integration is discussed and a move away from unanimity towards supranational institutions is proposed, they refuse. Unless an extraordinary development hits the EU, it is unlikely that a sudden drive for more integration becomes the consensus of all the member states.

So to create more integration and thereby overcome the struggles created by unanimity, it is necessary to have unanimity, but this is properly not going to happen,

since there is always going to be states, that prefer status quo. The same is in many regards true about credibility, CSDP have to do some more substantive actions, which they can not do, due to the lack of credibility. Therefore it is a paradox.

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